The impact of European integration on the German system of pharmaceutical product authorization by Schmucker, Rolf
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institut für Medizinische Soziologie 
Fachbereich Medizin der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität 
Frankfurt am Main 
Oktober 2008
 
Rolf Schmucker 
The Impact of European Integration on the 
German System of Pharmaceutical Product 
Authorization 
 
Diskussionspapier 2008 - 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institut für Medizinische Soziologie 
Direktor: Prof. Dr. Dr. Thomas Gerlinger 
 
Zentrum für Gesundheitswissenschaften 
Fachbereich Medizin der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität 
Theodor-Stern-Kai 7 
60590 Frankfurt am Main 
Telefon: (0 69) 63 01 – 76 10 
Fax:       (0 69) 63 01 – 66 21 
Website: http://www.kgu.de/zgw/medsoz 
 
ISSN 1861-5732    
Abstract 
The European Union has evolved since 1965 into an influential political player in the regu-
lation of pharmaceutical safety standards. The objective of establishing a single European 
market for pharmaceuticals makes it necessary for member-states to adopt uniform safety 
standards and marketing authorization procedures. This article investigates the impact of 
the  European  integration  process  on  the  German  marketing  authorization  system  for 
pharmaceuticals. The analysis shows that the main focal points and objectives of Euro-
pean regulation of pharmaceutical safety have shifted since 1965. The initial phase saw 
the introduction of uniform European safety standards as a result of which Germany was 
obliged  to  undertake  “catch-up”  modernization.  From  the  mid-1970s,  these  standards 
were extended and specified in greater detail. Since the mid-1990s, a process of reorien-
tation has been under way. The formation of the European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products (EMEA) and the growing importance of the European authorization 
procedure, combined with intensified global competition on pharmaceutical markets, are 
exerting indirect pressure for EU member-states to adjust their medicines policies. Con-
sequently, over the past few years Germany has been engaged in a competition-oriented 
reorganization of its pharmaceutical product authorization system the outcome of which 
will be to give higher priority to economic interests. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Europäische Gemeinschaft ist in der Regulierung der Arzneimittelsicherheit seit 1965 
zu einem einflussreichen politischen Akteur geworden. Das Ziel eines einheitlichen euro-
päischen  Marktes  für  Arzneimittel  erfordert  eine  Vereinheitlichung  der  Sicherheitsstan-
dards  und  Zulassungsverfahren  in  den  Mitgliedstaaten.  Im  folgenden  Beitrag  wird  der 
Frage nachgegangen, welche Auswirkungen der Prozess der Europäischen Integration 
auf das System der Arzneimittelzulassung in Deutschland hat. Es wird deutlich, dass sich 
die  Schwerpunkte  und Zielsetzungen  der  europäischen  Regulierung  der  Arzneimittelsi-
cherheit seit 1965 verschoben haben. Nach einer ersten Phase der Etablierung einheitli-
cher europäischer Sicherheitsstandards, die in Deutschland eine nachholende Moderni-
sierung erforderlich machten, wurden diese Standards seit Mitte der 1970er Jahre ausge-
baut und präzisiert. Seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre kommt es zu einer Neuausrichtung. Die 
Errichtung der europäischen Arzneimittelagentur EMEA und der Bedeutungsgewinn der 
europäischen Zulassungsverfahren erzeugen in Verbindung mit dem verschärften globa-
len Wettbewerb auf den Arzneimittelmärkten einen mittelbaren Anpassungsdruck auf die 
nationalen Arzneimittelpolitiken. In der Konsequenz wird in Deutschland seit einigen Jah-
ren eine wettbewerbsorientierte Umgestaltung der Arzneimittelzulassung betrieben, die zu 
einer Aufwertung ökonomischer Interessen im Zulassungssystem führt.    
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1.  Introduction 
For a long time, government control of pharmaceutical safety was  weak in the former 
West Germany compared with some other countries. While the United States established 
a national regulatory authority, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as early as 1906 
and the Scandinavian countries brought pharmaceutical product authorization under state 
control in the 1920s, West Germany enacted its first national Medicines Act (Arzneimittel-
gesetz, AMG) only in 1961 (Stapel 1988). The 1961 Act still did not introduce a marketing 
authorization procedure based on material examination of pharmaceutical safety by a go-
vernment agency. Instead, manufacturers were merely required to have their products 
registered  by  the  Federal  Health  Office.  The  government’s  low-key  role  in  regulating 
pharmaceutical safety was mainly attributable to Germany’s corporatist political culture, in 
which  industry  ranked  highly  and  was  long  able  to  prevent  direct  state  intervention 
(Daemmrich 2003; Murswieck 1983). 
From the early 1960s, this situation began to change. One can identify three develop-
ments that brought about a change in Germany’s medicines policy. The first was the oc-
currence of medicine-related disasters, especially the thalidomide catastrophe in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, which sensitized the general public to the risks associated with 
the supply of medicines and increased political pressure for stricter state regulation (Kirk 
1999).  Second,  as  markets  for  pharmaceuticals  became  increasingly  international,  the 
lack of state control over pharmaceutical safety became a hindrance to the export of Ger-
man products (Maio 2001). The third development was the process of European integra-
tion, a core objective of which was to create a single European market and thus a com-
mon market for pharmaceuticals (Mossialos et.al. 2004).  
Since the mid-1960s, in pursuit of its objective of creating a single European market “in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accor-
dance with the Treaty” (Article 14 Paragraph 2 TEC), Europe has become an important 
player in medicines policy. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enter-
prise and Industry is concerned with advancing harmonization of member-states’ different 
legal bases in respect of the manufacture, authorization, trade in and use of pharmaceuti-
cals. However, for a long time conflicts of interests between the Commission, member-
states, the pharmaceutical industry and consumers made hard going of progress on creat-
ing a single European market for pharmaceuticals (Feick 2002). The range of pharmaceu-
ticals on sale still differs widely from country to country (Folino-Gallo et.al.: 2001).    8 
European  pharmaceuticals  policy  is  characterized  as  industry-oriented  because  a)  the 
interests of manufacturers and the Directorate-General for Enterprise largely coincide, b) 
the Commission has more powers over industrial policy than over health policy and c) 
political decisions depend on industry’s “information monopoly”. At the same time, other 
stakeholders such as consumer protection associations or health policy actors are con-
siderably less closely integrated into the European policy process than are pharmaceutical 
industry associations (Permanand 2008). How these developments at the European level 
will impact on authorization procedures for, and the safety of, pharmaceuticals, is debat-
able. Optimistic appraisals assume that the Europeanization of authorization procedures 
will lead to high-level harmonization based more on scientific expertise than on member-
states’ particular interests (Krapohl 2004). Sceptics, in contrast, see a risk that closeness 
to industry will produce a “commercial bias in drug regulation”, toward competition policy 
goals, while safety standards and patient protection will tend to carry less weight (Abra-
ham/Lewis 2003; Garattini/Bertele 2004). 
This paper examines how the Europeanization of pharmaceuticals policy has impacted on 
the system of pharmaceuticals authorization in Germany. To this end it analyses the de-
velopment of safety standards and the change in the legal and institutional foundations of 
pharmaceutical product authorization in the European Community and in Germany. This 
study investigated the impact of the European integration process on the regulation of 
pharmaceutical safety in Germany by analysing the content of European and German 
legal instruments. The research material comprised the European Directives and Regula-
tions relevant to the regulation of pharmaceutical safety, along with the German acts and 
statutory orders that serve to implement European law (Table 1). The research covers the 
period from 1961 to 2007. Changes in the German legal position induced by European 
law were appraised with a view to ascertaining whether, directly or indirectly, they raised 
or lowered safety standards. Changes in the objectives of government regulation of phar-
maceuticals were analysed on the basis of the recitals in EU secondary legislation and the 
statements of grounds for draft laws of the German federal government. 
 
2.  Three Phases of Europeanization 
The development of Europeanization in the area of pharmaceutical safety can be divided 
into three chronological phases that differ in terms of subject matter, goals and intensity of 
regulation. This paper suggests that during the period from 1965 to 2007 European phar-
maceuticals policy should be divided into three separate phases. It considers each phase   9 
in the light of the substantial changes in the legal bases at EC/EU level and appraises its 
impact on the German regulatory system. 
 
2.1.  First Phase of Europeanization 1965–1976: Catch-up Modernization of Ger-
man System of Pharmaceutical Product Authorization 
The Europeanization of pharmaceuticals policy began in 1965 with the adoption of Direc-
tive  65/65/EEC.  The  statement  of grounds for this  Directive  mentions  Europeanization 
motives and states that the “primary purpose” is to safeguard public health. However, it 
goes on to say that this objective must be attained by means “which will not hinder the 
development of the pharmaceutical industry or trade in pharmaceuticals within the Com-
munity”. This dual objective runs like a red thread through the history of European phar-
maceutical regulation. 
The main features of the first phase of Europeanization were the harmonization of basic 
concepts, the formulation of a general authorization requirement, and specification of the 
criteria  for  authorization  and  the  documentation  to  be  submitted.  Directive  65/65/EEC 
stipulated that no pharmaceutical was to be placed on the market of an EC member-state 
unless a marketing authorization had been issued by the competent authorities of that 
member-state. The Directive mentions the authorization criteria quality, safety and effi-
cacy,  which  are  still  valid  today.  It  rests  with  the  competent  state  authority  to  check 
whether the pharmaceutical in question meets these criteria. The Directive also lists a 
number of documents the applicant is required to submit for scrutiny. Along with the re-
sults of product tests, they included particulars of side-effects and contra-indications and 
of the control methods employed by the manufacturer. 
The requirements laid down in Directive 65/65/EEC were stated more precisely and ex-
panded in 1975, in Directives 75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC. The manufacturing process 
now had to fulfil stricter criteria and government authorities were empowered to monitor 
companies’ compliance with statutory regulations by way of regular inspections. The Di-
rective on tests and trials (75/318/EWG) specified in detail the requirements that docu-
mentation submitted with the authorization application had to fulfil. It stipulated that the 
testing of pharmaceutical safety in EC member-states must be based on analytical and 
pharmaco-toxicological tests and clinical trials.  
The European directives in the first phase of Europeanization marked the start of a proc-
ess whereby powers that had previously rested solely with national states were trans-  10
ferred to the European level. At first, this was effected in tentative steps. At EC level, 
common definitions for the object of regulation were agreed and general requirements in 
respect of development, manufacture and authorization were formulated. Member-states’ 
governments rejected any further-reaching transfers of power. At that time, the Commis-
sion was still far from attaining the objective of a common market in pharmaceuticals. 
Nonetheless, the first European regulations generated a not inconsiderable need for Ger-
many to adjust its pharmaceuticals policy. The 1961 Medicines Act provided for only weak 
government regulation of the pharmaceuticals sector. In particular, it did not stipulate that 
new pharmaceuticals required state authorization. Nonetheless, the revised form of phar-
maceutical product authorization was controversial both among politicians and in the in-
dustry. There was a significant delay before the requirements laid down in European di-
rectives were eventually incorporated into the 1976 Medicines Act (AMG 1976). This Act 
introduced a requirement for state authorization of pharmaceuticals such as had long ex-
isted in other countries (Table 2). The powers of the competent government authority, the 
Federal Health Office, were increased. In the context of the authorization procedure, it 
now had the task of subjecting manufacturers’ applications to a material test. The Euro-
pean guidelines regarding the testing of medicines and the documentation to be submitted 
were incorporated into German law. For the first time, the quality, efficacy and safety of 
pharmaceuticals had to be proven before they were placed on the German market. The 
tests that manufacturers were required to carry out on pharmaceuticals were expanded on 
the basis of Directive 75/318/EEC (Table 3). Likewise induced by European law was the 
requirement  that  the  documentation  to  be  submitted  must  be  evaluated  by  an  expert 
whose report must also be submitted to the authority. 
One could continue the list of more stringent requirements laid down in the 1976 Medi-
cines  Act.  The  introduction  of  compulsory  authorization  and  the  associated  guidelines 
marked a qualitative transition in the regulation of pharmaceuticals in Germany that could 
be described as catch-up modernization. During this phase, the process of Europeaniza-
tion resulted in a noticeable expansion of safety regulations.  
 
2.2.  Second Phase of Europeanization, 1976–1993: Extension and Detailed Speci-
fication of Authorization Requirements 
The  creation  of  a  single  European  market  remained  a  central  objective  of  European 
pharmaceuticals  policy  after  1975.  However,  the  second  phase  of  Europeanization  is 
marked  more  by  incremental  advances  in  the  Europeanization  process.  The  Commis-  11
sion’s efforts to simplify market authorization in various countries, and EC-wide, failed on 
account of opposition from member-states. The multi-state procedure introduced in 1975 
and amended in 1983 (Directives 75/319/EEC, 83/570/EEC) was designed to enable ap-
plicants to place pharmaceuticals that have marketing authorization in one member-state 
on the market in other member-states without going through the entire national authoriza-
tion procedure there. For this, the authorities of the other member-states would have to 
recognize the initial marketing authorization. In practice, in nearly every case the member-
states involved withheld their approval, so the procedure was hardly used. A similar thing 
happened to the concertation procedure introduced in 1987 (Directive 87/22/EEC) with the 
aim of ensuring uniform authorization of “high-technology medicinal products” throughout 
the Community. The European component of this procedure consisted in the newly estab-
lished Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) having to draw up an expert 
report  on  the  pharmaceutical  in  question,  including  a  recommendation  on  whether  it 
should be authorized. However, the ultimate decision to authorize a pharmaceutical still 
rested with individual national authorities, which were not bound by the CPMP’s recom-
mendation. Since it was not binding, the concertation process did not represent a break-
through in establishing a single European market for pharmaceuticals either. 
In view of member-states’ dogged resistance to a European authorization procedure and 
differences of opinion in the pharmaceutical industry (where many companies were keen 
to retain tried and trusted national procedures and agencies), in the period from 1975 to 
1992 the main focus of European pharmaceuticals policy was on further development of 
the standards to be applied in testing pharmaceuticals and in authorization procedures. In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of directives on individual aspects of pharmaceu-
tical product authorization were adopted (Table 1). The scope of European regulation was 
extended to include immunological, radioactive and homoeopathic medicines and phar-
maceuticals  made  from  human  blood  or  plasma  (Directives  89/341/EEC,  89/342/EEC, 
89/343/EEC, 89/381/EEC, 92/73/EEC). European guidelines for good manufacturing prac-
tice (GMP) were developed (Directives 89/341/EEC, 91/356/EEC), uniform regulations on 
prescription requirements were issued (Directive 92/26/EEC) and instructions for labelling 
and package leaflets were expanded (Directive 89/341/EEC, 92/27/EEC). In 1991, the 
legal and administrative provisions for pharmaceutical testing were revised to take ac-
count  of  recent  scientific  and  technological  developments  (Directive  91/507/EEC).  The 
European Community further imposed a Europe-wide ban on advertising to the general 
public medicines available only on prescription and those containing psychotropic or nar-
cotic substances (Directives 89/552/EEC, 92/28/EEC).   12
Once more, the more  detailed  specification  und  consolidation  of  European  regulations 
generated a need for Germany to adjust its pharmaceuticals policy accordingly. This was 
done  mainly  through  the  1994  Medicines  (Amendment)  Act  (AMG-Änderungsgesetz). 
Unlike in the first phase, there was now no need for a fundamental reform of authoriza-
tion-relevant standards. On the contrary, the Medicines Act of 1976 had gone beyond the 
scope of the European standard in some respects, so there was less need for amendment 
(e.g. the compulsory package leaflet). 
The  authorization  objectives  formulated  in  the  previous  phase  were  not  fundamentally 
changed. No new quality in the Europeanization of pharmaceuticals policy is discernible in 
the second phase, and there was no change in the apportionment of powers between 
national governments and European institutions. While there was further standardization 
of definitions, norms and standards at the European level, decisions on allowing pharma-
ceuticals access to member-states’ markets remained within the remit of national agen-
cies alone. As regards regulation of pharmaceutical safety in Germany, the process of 
Europeanization between 1975 and 1993 led in some areas to an expansion of the previ-
ously established authorization system. 
 
2.3.  Third Phase of Europeanization, 1993–2007: Pharmaceutical Product Au-
thorization in Twofold Competition 
Though  no  breakthrough  toward  a  single  European  market  for  pharmaceuticals  was 
achieved  during  the  second  phase,  some  important  decisions  concerning  the  further 
course of the European integration process had been taken. In the field of pharmaceuti-
cals, they began to show effects in 1993. The starting point for the accelerated Europe-
anization of pharmaceutical regulation during the third phase was the 1985 White Paper 
on Completing the Internal Market, which lent a new dynamic to the European integration 
project after a phase of stagnation (Commission 1985). A central concern of the Commis-
sion was to remove the obstacles to trade presented by differing technical norms and 
standards. Along with efforts to harmonize standards throughout Europe, it now consoli-
dated the strategy of mutual recognition of existing national product regulations.  
Regulation 93/2309/EEC established the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products  (EMEA)  and  introduced  a  centralized  authorization  procedure,  and  Directive 
93/39/EEC established the mutual recognition procedure. These fundamentally changed 
the institutional and procedural bases of pharmaceutical product authorization in the EU.   13
The centralized authorization procedure replaced the concertation mechanism and cre-
ated an EC-wide marketing authorization for “high-technology medicinal products”. This 
centralized procedure is obligatory in the EC for pharmaceuticals derived from biotechnol-
ogy. In other words, national authorization procedures are no longer permitted for a de-
fined group of innovative medicines. Member-states may opt to use the centralized proce-
dure for a further group of “innovative compounds”. The EMEA, or rather the affiliated 
Committee for Proprietary Medical Products (CPMP), draws up an expert report that forms 
the basis for the Commission’s decision on authorization. The Committee, whose mem-
bers are representatives of national regulatory agencies, refers an application for a mar-
keting  authorization  to  a  rapporteur  who  is  a  representative  of  a  national  regulatory 
agency. The rapporteur examines the documentation and draws up an evaluation report 
that is passed to the Commission. Member-states’ governments are given a say in the 
authorization decision through the intergovernmental Standing Committee on Medicinal 
Products for Human Use, which is located in the Commission. If the Standing Committee 
opposes the Commission’s vote, the decision is referred to the European Council. How-
ever, the Standing Committee has no veto and can be outvoted by a qualified majority of 
the Council. 
The  multi-state  procedure  initiated  in  1975  had  very  little  impact.  National  authorizing 
agencies  continued  to  make  autonomous  decisions  and  seldom  recognized  marketing 
authorizations granted by other member-states. The new mutual recognition procedure 
(Directive 93/39 EEC) was therefore extended to include a binding European arbitration 
process. Now, if there are irreconcilable differences of opinion between a member-state in 
which a particular pharmaceutical has been authorized (the reference member-state or 
RMS) and a member-state where an application for recognition of the authorization has 
been lodged (the concerned member-state or CMS), the matter is referred to the CPMP. 
The CPMP draws up its own expert report evaluating the risk to public health and votes 
for or against authorization. The Commission takes a decision on this basis, with the par-
ticipation of the Standing Committee (and, if need be, the Council). All the member-states 
involved, whether RMS or CMS, are bound by the Commission’s (or the Council’s) deci-
sion. 
The formation of the EMEA and extension of the European authorization procedure, the 
scope  of  which  was  further  expanded  in  2004  (Regulation  726/2004,  Directive 
2004/27/EC), did not substantially change the criteria and standards to be followed for 
marketing  authorization.  However,  since  1993  they  have  led  to  a  far-reaching  shift  of 
powers to European institutions. In particular, the CPMP, which in 2005 was renamed the   14
Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) has been elevated into the 
main player in the authorization of pharmaceuticals in Europe. Although the Committee is 
made up of representatives of member-states, they are obliged to act within the frame-
work of procedural and normative regulations set at the European level and are subject to 
mutual  scrutiny.  Expert  reports  by  the  Committee  form  the  basis  for  decisions  by  the 
Commission or the Council on authorizing a pharmaceutical for the entire EU market. Na-
tional authorization procedures have lost much of their relevance since 1995. A different 
division of labour is evolving within the EU, with national authorities assuming a new role. 
Now, they increasingly act as part of the European regulatory network, either as a mem-
ber of the CHMP or as an RMS or CMS in the mutual recognition procedure. 
The new European division of labour has prompted an institutional transformation in the 
German pharmaceuticals authorization system. Internal restructuring was initiated in 2004 
with the aim of improving the speed and efficiency with which the Federal Institute for 
Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) processes applications for marketing authorization 
(BMGS 2005). In 2007 the German federal government published a draft bill to usher in 
the transformation of the BfArM into the German Drugs Agency (DAMA). It is taking this 
action in pursuit of an adjustment to the Europeanization of pharmaceutical product au-
thorization that does not directly serve to implement European legal instruments but is a 
consequence of developments since 1995. In the preamble to the bill, the German gov-
ernment argues that a situation of twofold competition exists. On the one hand, pharma-
ceutical  enterprises  face  tougher  international  competition.  On  the  other,  the  German 
medicines licensing agency is in competition with other national authorities in Europe. Like 
the European Commission, the German government sees the outlook for European phar-
maceutical product authorization as a drastically reduced network comprising the EMEA 
and a few national agencies. No longer will forty-one agencies in twenty-seven member-
states participate in European procedures as EMEA partners, but in their place a small 
number of efficient, fast and scientifically excellent authorities. The German licensing au-
thority is to undergo a fundamental institutional reform to equip it for inter-agency competi-
tion (Bundesregierung 2007).  
The core features of the restructuring process since 2004 relate to: 
•  Organizational  Streamlining:  Efficiency  gains  are  to  be  achieved  by  changing 
competences and responsibilities within the agency. A reduction in the number of 
departments and organizational units and the formation of project teams is de-
signed to accelerate the authorization procedure.   15
•  Benchmarking and Change Management: In future, the work of the Institute will 
undergo continuous review and any necessary changes in organization, control 
and planning will be implemented speedily. Senior management is to be enabled 
to take rapid, flexible decisions. 
•  Professional  Competence:  The  scientific  know-how  of  the  BfArM  has  been  ex-
panded. The Institute’s own laboratory work has been expanded and cooperation 
with universities has been consolidated. The idea is that concentrating specialists 
in a variety of interdisciplinary teams will make decision-making processes more 
effective. 
•  Improved Access for Applicants: Pharmaceutical companies, or applicants, have 
been given better access facilities to the licensing agency. For the first time, com-
panies will be given the telephone numbers of the employees responsible for dea-
ling with their application and will be able to contact them directly. 
 
The German government’s draft bill makes provision for further steps in future: 
•  Greater  Autonomy  for  the  Institute:  The  Institute’s  legal  form  is  to  be  changed 
(from an independent higher federal authority to a public-law corporation directly 
under  federal  government  control).  The  aim  is  to  enable  it  to  act  with  greater 
autonomy from the Federal Health Ministry and to get it to abandon its previous 
“typical civil-service” ethos in favour of a “market-oriented” orientation. The Federal 
Health Ministry will still be responsible for legal and technical oversight, but its au-
thority to issue instructions will be reduced. 
•  New Senior Management: The DAMA is to be headed by a two-person board of 
management appointed for a fixed term. Their remuneration will be performance-
related and based on annual targets agreed with the Health Ministry. The board is 
to have organizational, staffing and financial autonomy. 
•  Pharmaceutical Product Authorization to be Financed by Fees: After a transitional 
phase, pharmaceutical product authorization is to be wholly financed by fees from 
industry. The present system of mixed financing by taxes and fees is to be discon-
tinued in the medium term. 
•  Improvement in Scientific Expertise: The board’s greater organizational and finan-
cial scope for action is to be utilized to improve its access to scientific experts. The   16
DAMA is to be given the option to pay employees outside collectively agreed pay 
scales  to  make  it  easier  for  it  to  recruit  highly  qualified  specialists  (Bundes-
regierung 2007). 
 
Since the establishing of the EMEA and the reform of the European authorization proce-
dure, the Europeanization of pharmaceutical product authorization has unleashed a new 
dynamic in German pharmaceutical policy. The present changes in the German system 
are not happening because of the need to implement European law, but rather as a result 
of the changed economic, legal and institutional context. This is an indirect form of Euro-
peanization and its consequences for pharmaceutical safety are a hot topic of discussion. 
 
3.  Competition-orientated Restructuring of the Authorization System 
The first two phases of Europeanization in pharmaceutical product authorization had the 
result of raising pharmaceutical safety standards in Germany. The introduction of compul-
sory  state  authorization  in  1976  was  essentially  based  on  the  precepts  in  Directives 
65/65/EEC  and  75/319/EEC.  During  this  period,  Europeanization  led  to  the  seemingly 
contradictory outcome that national authorities had to cede the power to issue directives 
and norms to European institutions, while in return member-states’ powers to issue mar-
keting authorization were strengthened on the basis of European law. The requirement for 
state approval and the fundamental authorization criteria of efficacy, quality and safety 
were agreed by the European Community prior to their translation into German law. In the 
case  of  Germany  one  can  record  that  the  Europeanization  of  safety  standards  in  the 
pharmaceuticals sector had the effect of strengthening government regulation of risks. 
However, this assessment is not transferable to other countries. For countries such as 
Sweden and Norway which had a fully-fledged system of state authorization prior to 1965, 
Europeanization  meant  a  partial  dismantling  of  state  regulatory  powers  (Norris  1998, 
Rehnberg 2002). 
Nonetheless, the character of Europeanization underwent a marked change in 1993. The 
introduction of binding European authorization procedures and the formation of the EMEA 
placed the institutional structure of pharmaceutical product authorization in the EC on a 
new footing. From now on, there was an elaborate, multi-layered European system of 
pharmaceutical product authorization in which the participating actors had experienced a 
reallocation of tasks. At the EC level, there was a change from a weak to a strong “regula-  17
tory state” (Abraham/Lewis 2003). The integration of national authorities into a European 
authorization system resulted in a distinct loss of powers at the national level. Subse-
quently, national authorization procedures played a subordinate role, both economically 
and medically. National regulatory authorities began to compete for commissions from 
industry (as the RMS in mutual recognition procedures) or the EMEA (as rapporteurs in 
the centralized authorization procedure). 
The  changes  in  pharmaceutical  product  authorization  are  embedded  in  a  competition-
oriented political strategy, the aim of which was to make the EU the “most dynamic and 
most competitive economic zone on earth” (the Lisbon Strategy), and in which the phar-
maceutical and biotech industry plays an important role (European Council 2000, Com-
mission 2002, Commission 2003). As an innovative, forward-looking sector, it is attributed 
with considerable growth and employment potential. To encourage this potential, the aim 
is to place new pharmaceuticals quickly on the market. Now, state supervision of pharma-
ceutical safety is increasingly regarded as a part of the pharmaceutical value chain (Bos-
ton Consulting Group 2001). 
The formation of the EMEA and the establishing of the European authorization procedure 
required no direct implementing legislation in member-states. This distinguishes the third 
phase of Europeanization from the previous two, when standards were specified for legis-
lation on pharmaceuticals. Nonetheless, recent developments elicited a response from 
German politicians that consists making the national licensing authority more competitive. 
The German government is keen for the procedure for authorizing pharmaceuticals to be 
faster and more efficient in future, and carried out in a manner that is more responsive 
toward the industry (Task Force 2004, 2005). The licensing authority should see itself in-
creasingly as a Europe-oriented service and to distinguish itself to its “customers” in the 
industry by its cooperative, fast and efficient way of working. This change in the regulatory 
system tends to make the authority and applicants “virtual allies” with at least partially i-
dentical interests (Abraham/Lewis 1999). 
 
Although safety standards have not been lowered, there is cause for concern that the 
changes in the institutional framework of pharmaceutical product authorization in the EC 
and its consequences in the German system will have a negative impact on pharmaceuti-
cal safety (ISDB 2005, Kiewel 2003). This is because of the special nature of the deci-
sions to be taken. The safety of a new pharmaceutical is evaluated on the basis of previ-
ous clinical trials conducted by the applicant. Since the tests involve a limited number of   18
subjects, there are limits to the certainty of statements about the risks that using that 
product entails. Scientists in the licensing agencies weigh up the benefits and risks on the 
basis of information submitted. In many cases they have some scope for discretion. How 
they exercise this discretion is connected not least with the regulators’ institutional frame-
work and the way they see their role. If there is mounting (economic) pressure on the li-
censing  authority  and  its  employees  to  process  authorization  applications  quickly  and 
successfully,  decision-makers  may  become  more  willing  to  take  risks  (Lexchin  1994). 
Many political decision-makers share this concern. The German government’s proposals 
for further-reaching  changes  in  pharmaceutical  product  authorization  (Bundesregierung 
2005; BMGS 2005), which include funding the licensing agency entirely from applicants’ 
fees, have come to nothing for the time being due to resistance from both the parliamen-
tary opposition and the parties of government. However, this does not mark the end of re-
engineering of the regulatory system for pharmaceutical safety. Against the background of 
the European developments outlined, competition-oriented restructuring of the German 
marketing authorization system is still on the political agenda (Zöller/Straubinger 2007).    19
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Tables 
Table 1:   List of European and German Legal Instruments Analysed 
Year  Legal Instrument  Object of Regulation  Regulatory  
level 
1961  Medicines Act 1961  Definitions, prohibitions, registration. etc.  National 
(law) 
1964  Medicines Act (Second 
Amendment Act) 
More stringent testing requirements, prescription drugs  National 
(law) 
1965  Directive 65/65/EEC  Authorization on the basis of the criteria of efficacy, quality, 
safety 
European 
1971  Medicines Testing Direc-
tive 
Pharmaco-toxicological tests and clinical trials   National 
(ordinance) 
1975  Directive 75/318/EEC  Analytical and pharmaco-toxicological tests and clinical 
trials 
European 
1975  Directive 75/319/EEC  Extension of Directive 65/65/EEC; CPMP, multi-state pro-
cedure 
European 
1976  Medicines Act 1976  Authorization procedure  National 
(law) 
1983  Directive 83/570/EEC  Reform of multi-state procedure  European 
1986  Medicines Act  Second Amendment Act to the Medicines Act  National 
(law) 
1987  Directive 87/22/EEC  Concertation process  European 
1988  Operational ordinance  First amending ordinance to the operational ordinance for 
pharmaceutical entrepreneurs 
National 
(ordinance) 
1989  Directive 89/341/EEC  Amends Directives 65/65, 75/318, 75/319  European 
1989  Directive 89/342/EEC  Immunological medicines  European 
1989  Directive 89/343/EEC  Radioactive medicines  European 
1989  Directive 89/381/EEC  Medicines made from human blood or plasma  European 
1989  Directive 89/552/EEC  Ban on TV advertising of prescription medicines  European 
1991  Directive 91/356/EEC  Good manufacturing practice  European 
1991  Directive 91/507/EEC   Approximation of legal and administrative regulations for 
testing pharmaceuticals 
European 
1992  Directive 92/26/EEC  Regulations concerning prescription medicines  European 
1992  Directive 92/27/EEC  Labelling and package leaflet  European 
1992  Directive 92/28/EEC  Ban on advertising medicines available only on prescription 
to the general public 
European 
1992  Directive 92/73/EEC  Registration procedure for homoeopathic medicines  European 
1993  Regulation 2309/93/EEC  EMEA and centralized authorization procedure  European 
1993  Directive 93/39/EEC  Mutual recognition process; European conciliation proce-
dure; European pharmaco-vigilance system 
European 
1994  Medicines Act (Fifth 
Amendment Act) 
Implementation of European Directives of the years 1989 to 
1991 
National 
(law) 
2001  Directive 2001/83/EC  Common code for pharmaceuticals for human use  European 
2004  Regulation 726/2004/EC  EMEA and centralized authorization procedure  European 
2004  Directive 2004/27/EC  Mutual recognition process and decentralized procedure  European 
2005  First draft of the law to 
establish DAMA 
Transformation of the BfArM into a German Drugs Agency  National 
(draft law) 
2007  Second draft of the law to 
establish DAMA 
Transformation of the BfArM into a German Drugs Agency  National 
(draft law) 
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Table 2:  Pharmaceutical Testing Requirements for Manufacturers 1961–1976 
Drug Registration and Administration Act, 1961  “… pharmacological and medical testing of the proprietary 
pharmaceutical” (§ 21 Para. 1 Item 4) 
Drug Registration and Administration Act, 1964  “… pharmacological and clinical and in special cases 
other medical testing” § 21 Para. 1a) 
Directive 65/65/EEC  “… physico-chemical, biological or microbiological tests; 
pharmacological and toxicological tests; clinical trials” 
(Article 4 Number 8)￿ 
European Commission Proposal, 1970  Detailed guidelines for analytical, pharmacological and 
toxicological tests and clinical trials 
Drug Testing Directive, 1971 (FRG)  Detailed guidelines for pharmaco-toxicological tests and 
clinical trials 
Directive 75/318/EEC  Detailed guidelines for analytical and pharmaco-
toxicological tests and clinical trials 
Drug Registration and Administration Act, 1976  Necessity of analytical and pharmaco-toxicological tests 
and clinical or other medical trials (§ 22 Para. 2) 
Issuing of detailed guidance for testing pharmaceuticals 
by the relevant federal ministry (§ 26 Para. 1) 
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Table 3:  Regulation of Placement of Pharmaceuticals on the Market 
  Drug Registration and Administra-
tion Act 1961 (FRG) 
Directive 65/65/EEC  Drug Registration and 
Administration Act 1976 
(FRG) 
Mechanism 
for placing on 
the market 
Registration  Authorization  Authorization 
Criteria for 
placing on the 
market 
- Material composition according to 
German Pharmacopoeia (DAB) (§ 5 
Para. 1) 
- No damage to health beyond a 
“justifiable extent” (§ 6) 
- Harmlessness, thera-
peutic efficacy, quality 
of composition (Art. 5) 
Quality, efficacy, safety (§ 
1) 
Withholding of 
authorization 
to place on 
the market 
- No registration if documentation 
required under § 21 is incomplete 
- Authorization to place on the mar-
ket will be withheld if the pharma-
ceuticals “when used as directed 
cause harmful effects that exceed a 
degree that is justifiable in accor-
dance with the findings of medical 
science”, or if they “when used as 
directed because of their nature” 
are harmful to health (§ 6) 
- When placed on the market by 
regional authorities, if medicines fail 
to comply with the regulations on 
dealings in pharmaceuticals and 
administering them could “put the 
general public at risk” (§ 42). 
- Approval will be with-
held if the pharmaceu-
tical is harmful, not 
therapeutically effica-
cious or incorrectly 
composed (Article 5) 
- Approval will be with-
held if documentation 
submitted does not 
comply with guidelines 
(Art. 5) 
 
- Approval will be withheld 
if documentation is in-
complete 
- Documentation will be 
withheld if the pharmaceu-
tical was inadequately 
tested 
- Approval will be withheld 
if the pharmaceutical 
possesses no appropriate 
quality 
- Approval will be withheld 
if not therapeutically effi-
cacious of if insufficient 
evidence of efficacy 
- Approval will be withheld 
if there is good cause to 
suspect that a pharma-
ceutical “when used as 
directed causes harmful 
effects that exceed a 
degree that is justifiable in 
accordance with the find-
ings of medical science” 
(§ 25 Para. 2) 
Suspension, 
Withdrawal, 
Revocation of 
Placement on 
the Market 
 
- Register entry will be deleted if the 
proprietor of the registration number 
applies for this to be done (§ 25 
Para. 2 Number 1) 
- Register entry will be deleted if the 
proprietor fails to comply with a 
condition imposed by the authority 
in respect of complete and accurate 
information on the receptacle and 
outer wrapping of the proprietary 
pharmaceutical (§ 25 Para. 2 Num-
ber 2) 
- Approval will be with-
held, suspended or 
revoked if the pharma-
ceutical is harmful, 
lacking in therapeutic 
efficacy or incorrectly 
composed 
- Approval will be with-
held or revoked if the 
information in the docu-
mentation is incorrect 
- Approval will be sus-
pended or revoked if 
the required monitoring 
of the pharmaceuticals 
is not carried out (Arti-
cle 11) 
- Approval will be with-
drawn if it subsequently 
becomes known that there 
was a reason to refuse 
approval when approval 
was issued, or if such 
reason arose subse-
quently (§ 30 Para. 1) 
- Approval will be with-
drawn if it turns out that 
the pharmaceutical is not 
therapeutically efficacious, 
(§ 30 Para. 1) 
- Approval will be with-
drawn if information pro-
vided is incorrect  
- Approval will be with-
drawn if conditions im-
posed are not complied 
with 
- Approval will be with-
drawn if quality tests are 
not carried out (§ 30 Para. 
2)   24
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